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MULTIRACIAL MALAISE: MULTIRACIAL
AS A LEGAL RACIAL CATEGORY
Taunya Lovell Banks*
[R]ace is at once an empty category and a powerful instrument.
—Melissa Nobles1
Racism is about race: more races can lead . . . to changes in the way racism
is presented, and ultimately to more, rather than less, racism.
—Paulette M. Caldwell2

INTRODUCTION
The fiftieth anniversary of Loving v. Virginia,3 which struck down
Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute, provides an opportunity to reflect on
Loving’s impact. A 2017 Pew Research Center analysis of U.S. Census
Bureau data found that interracial marriages constitute 17 percent of all
marriages,4 which represents an increase of 14 percent since the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Loving in 1967.5 One byproduct of the increase in
* Jacob A. France Professor of Equality Jurisprudence, University of Maryland Francis King
Carey School of Law. The author thanks Neil Gotanda, Tanya Hernández, Audrey McFarlane,
and Mildred Robinson for their comments on earlier versions of this Article. She also thanks
Gabrielle Phillips, class of 2018, and Jason Hawkins for their research assistance. This Article
was prepared for the Fordham Law Review Symposium entitled Fifty Years of Loving v.
Virginia and the Continued Pursuit of Racial Equality held at Fordham University School of
Law on November 2–3, 2017. For an overview of the Symposium, see R.A. Lenhardt, Tanya
K. Hernández & Kimani Paul-Emile, Foreword: Fifty Years of Loving v. Virginia and the
Continued Pursuit of Racial Equality, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2625 (2018).
1. MELISSA NOBLES, SHADES OF CITIZENSHIP: RACE AND THE CENSUS IN MODERN
POLITICS 12 (2000).
2. Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content of Our Characterizations, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L.
53, 63 (1990).
3. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding that Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute violated the due
process and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment).
4. Gretchen Livingston & Anna Brown, Intermarriage in the U.S. 50 Years After Loving
v. Virginia, PEW RES. CTR. (May 18, 2017), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/05/18/
intermarriage-in-the-u-s-50-years-after-loving-v-virginia [https://perma.cc/3FYN-N2PP].
5. Jesse J. Holland, 1 in 6 Newlyweds’ Spouse Is of Different Race or Ethnicity,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 18, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/f0795fbaf4d04ca793d834
f3d1eff57b [https://perma.cc/KQ99-WBHH]. The largest groups to intermarry are Asians (29
percent) and Hispanics (27 percent). Id. Blacks and whites intermarry at lower rates with
whites having the lowest rate of intermarriage (11 percent for white compared to 18 percent
for blacks), which suggests continued resistance to black-white interracial marriages. Id.
“Despite those numbers, intermarriage is rapidly becoming more popular among blacks and
whites.” Id.
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interracial marriages is the growing number and prominence of multiracial
children. For example, a July 2017 Brookings Institution report characterizes
Barack Obama, born six years before Loving, as the person who gave
growing “prominence” to the emergence of multiracial people in America.6
Increasingly, there is interest in the offspring of interracial unions and how
they compare to monoracial individuals. The Brookings Institution, for
example, reported that “there is no test score gap between white and
multiracial high school students.”7 The report seems to define “multiracial”
very narrowly as people with parents from different racialized groups.8 Yet
the multiracial population in the United States is not a new phenomenon. By
limiting multiracial “to first-generation children of interracial couples,”9 as
others have, the report fails to acknowledge older and larger generations
whose genealogical mixture is more distant. Many of the people within this
older multiracial population are racially classified by government and custom
as black or African American, and they constitute “around 40 [percent] of the
total population.”10 In contrast, according to the 2000 census, firstgeneration multiracial individuals (including those with remote African
ancestry) make up roughly 2 percent of the total population and are more
likely to be seen as multiracial.11
Proponents of a multiracial legal category complain that multiracial
individuals are harmed by not being recognized under law as multiracial.
Specifically, they argue that the law neither recognizes their personal identity
nor protects their right to self-identify racially and to have that identity
accepted.12 Despite the long history of multiracial people in the United
States, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection constitutional jurisprudence,
statutory antidiscrimination laws, and the census do not formally recognize a
separate multiracial category. Thus, the question is whether legal recognition
is needed to remedy race-based discrimination experienced by multiracial
individuals.13
Historically, courts grappling with racial-identity questions looked at three
factors, phenotypical characteristics, ancestry, and racial reputation in the
community, to resolve the issue.14 The courts relied on a binary classification
system of white and nonwhite; the underlying issue in these cases being
whether one party had any nonwhite ancestry. Thus, until recently, Barack
6. Jonathan Rothwell, Multiracial Adolescents Show No Test Score Gap with Whites,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (July 17, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/multi-racialadolescents-show-no-test-score-gap-with-whites/ [https://perma.cc/Y96K-HS6F].
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. Aaron Gullickson & Ann Morning, Choosing Race: Multiracial Ancestry and
Identification, 40 SOC. SCI. RES. 498, 501 (2011).
10. Id. at 500–01.
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 24–30, 38 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Scot Rives, Note, Multiracial Work: Handing Over the Discretionary
Judicial Tool of Multiracialism, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1334 (2011).
14. See generally ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON
TRIAL IN AMERICA (2008). For a more recent example, see Malone v. Haley, No. 88-339
(Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Suffolk Cty. July 25, 1989).
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Obama, despite his white mother, would be classified racially as black, since
twentieth-century notions of race held that any known African ancestry made
one black.15
Admittedly, since Loving, conventional notions of race in the United States
have “destabilized” as a result of “increases in immigration, intermarriage,
and cross-racial adoptions.”16
Reflecting the era of racial selfidentification,17 racial categories are more fluid in the twenty-first century,
even for people who, historically, racially classified as black. These
attitudinal changes are reflected in a 2007 Pew Research Center finding that
“[n]early four-in-ten African Americans (37%) say that blacks can no longer
be thought of as a single race” because of increasing diversity within that
community.18
Conventional blackness, where one is “black” if one’s African ancestry is
visible or known,19 is on the wane. As critical race theory legal scholar Neil
Gotanda posits, race—particularly the racial category “black”—while a
consistent and constant “social divider,” is not a “stable, coherent legal and
social concept.”20 Today, people with some African ancestry may move
away from blackness and, in some respects, the legal multiracial category
movement is an example.21
The focus of this Article is the underlying assumption of the Brookings
Institution report that multiracial individuals constitute a separate racial
category. My discussion of legal racial categories focuses only on
government “racial” definitions. Multiracial individuals should enjoy the
15. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1737 (1993); see,
e.g., Jason Carroll, Behind the Scenes: Is Barack Obama Black or Biracial?, CNN (June 9,
2008,
3:28
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/06/09/btsc.obama.race/
[https://perma.cc/3CDP-RAQT] (“A columnist examining Obama’s background summed up
his racial identity into one equation: white + black = black.”).
16. For a discussion and critique of these arguments, see David Roediger, The Retreat
from Race and Class, MONTHLY REV. (July 1, 2006), http://monthlyreview.org/
0706roediger.htm [https://perma.cc/4WPT-UC5F].
17. See Khaled A. Beydoun & Erika K. Wilson, Reverse Passing, 64 UCLA L. REV. 282,
306 (2017) (discussing how, after the dissolution of the Naturalization Act, “[i]ndividual
autonomy over racial identity became the norm, as individuals rather than courts became able
to self-identity their own race”); Camille Gear Rich, Elective Race: Recognizing Race
Discrimination in the Era of Racial Self-Identification, 102 GEO. L.J. 1501, 1530 (2014)
(arguing that the racial self-identification movement “assumes that many individuals will
fluidly move between racial identities”).
18. PEW RESEARCH CTR., OPTIMISM ABOUT BLACK PROGRESS DECLINES: BLACKS SEE
GROWING VALUES GAP BETWEEN POOR AND MIDDLE CLASS 4, 24 (2007),
http://pewsocialtrends.org/assets/pdf/Race.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWK2-K4LE]. Younger
black Americans, particularly those who were born after Loving, are more likely to report that
blacks are no longer a single race. Id.
19. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of ‘Our Constitution is Color-Blind,’ 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 24
(1991).
20. Id. at 23.
21. Charles Byrd, organizer of the 1996 Multiracial Solidarity March in Washington,
D.C., specifically rejects the notion that society treats “mixed-race” individuals “as a ‘subset’
of ‘blackness.’” JARED SEXTON, AMALGAMATION SCHEMES: ANTIBLACKNESS AND THE
CRITIQUE OF MULTIRACIALISM 57 (2008). The Declaration of Racial Independence composed
in 1997 by another multiracial advocate cites the “One Drop Rule” as a sign of racial hostility
toward multiracial individuals. Id. at 68–69.
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freedom to self-identify as they wish—and, like others, be afforded the
protections of antidiscrimination law. The question is whether a separate
legal racial category is needed to provide that protection. Race in this country
has been “crafted from the point of view of [white] race protection”22—
protecting the interests of white Americans from usurpation by nonwhites
and, unless the creation of a separate multiracial legal category advances this
goal, change will be resisted.
Commentaries grounded in Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause and federal statutory antidiscrimination jurisprudence shape the
construction of racial categories in U.S. law. This jurisprudence influences
the racial categories and definitions used for the census. The next Part briefly
discusses the attempt to get a multiracial category on the U.S. census.
I. THE MULTIRACIAL RACE CATEGORY CONTROVERSY
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) acts as a gatekeeper
designating the racial and ethnic categories used by the federal government
in the census and on various government reporting forms.23 The push for a
“multiracial” category on the U.S. census and the OMB’s directive on racial
and ethnic standards for statistics dates back to the late 1970s.24 Early
proponents were the white and black parents of multiracial children.25 Their
primary concern was that children of these interracial marriages would be
racially categorized as black.26 Attempts to add a multiracial category to
census forms for the 1990 and 2000 censuses failed.27 Instead, for the 2000
census, the compromise offered was the option of checking multiple race
boxes.28 Not satisfied, the multiracial category movement (MCM) and some

22. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE
MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW 106 (2017).
23. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DIRECTIVE NO. 15:
RACE AND ETHNIC STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL STATISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING
(1977), https://wonder.cdc.gov/WONDER/help/populations/bridged-race/Directive15.html
[https://perma.cc/78BZ-9M36].
24. For a history of late twentieth-century efforts to better define racial categories used in
the census, see HEATHER M. DALMAGE, TRIPPING ON THE COLOR LINE: BLACK-WHITE
MULTIRACIAL FAMILIES IN A RACIALLY DIVIDED WORLD 143–151 (2000).
25. Tanya K. Hernández, ‘Multiracial’ Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of
Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 106 (1998).
26. Id. (citing Lewis R. Gordon, Specificities: Culture of American Identity: Critical
‘Mixed Race’?, 1 SOC. IDENTITIES 381, 382 (1995)). See generally Kevin D. Brown, The Rise
and Fall of the One-Drop Rule, in COLOR MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE MYTH OF A
POST-RACIAL AMERICA 44 (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2013). Arguably, the black-white
parents of these children want to convey some of the “property interests” of whiteness to their
biracial children. See Harris, supra note 15, at 1725 (arguing that whiteness comes with legally
protected benefits, which are the property interests of whiteness).
27. Bijan Gilanshah, Multiracial Minorities: Erasing the Color Line, 12 LAW &
INEQUALITY J. 183, 184–86 (1993); Rives, supra note 13, at 1315.
28. Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and
Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58,782, 58,788–90 (Oct. 30, 1997).
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“multiracial identity legal scholars”29 continue to push for a separate racial
category.30
Critics of a multiracial category argue that the term is “too broad to be
statutorily useful.”31 The question of definition is apparent when reviewing
how states responded to the MCM’s push for a multiracial category on local
data collection forms. Between 1992 and 2000, several states enacted
legislation or regulations acknowledging a multiracial category.32 But there
is no agreement about who falls within the category. A few states define
multiracial as persons having biological parents of different races.33 Other
state regulations (most often for public education forms) use the term without
definition.34 Many states have rejected attempts to add a multiracial category
to state forms.35

29. This term was coined by Tanya Hernández. Tanya Katerí Hernández, Racially-Mixed
Personal Identity Equality, 15 LAW CULTURE & HUM. 1, 2–3 (2017).
30. Tina Fernandes, Antidiscrimination Law and the Multiracial Experience: A Reply to
Nancy Leong, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191, 213 (2013); Rives, supra note 13, at
1334. Not all multiracial legal scholars agree with this approach. See, e.g., Nancy Leong,
Judicial Erasure of Mixed-Race Discrimination, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 469, 543–44 (2010)
(arguing for a focus on racial perception rather than racial categories); Rich, supra note 17, at
1569 (arguing for a legal right to racial self-definition). Some multiracial advocates support
abandoning racial categories altogether. SEXTON, supra note 21, at 69 (“[A]ny government
classifying its citizenry by race perpetuates racism.” (quoting Nathan Douglas, Declaration of
Racial Independence, INTERRACIAL VOICE (1997), https://web.archive.org/web/20000308
064629/http://www.webcom.com/~intvoice/natdoug2.html)).
Others argue for “racial
privacy.” Id. at 64.
31. NOBLES, supra note 1, at 140.
32. Kim M. Williams, Parties, Movements, and Constituencies in Categorizing Race:
State-Level Outcomes of Multiracial Category Legislation, in STATES, PARTIES, AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 197, 200 (Jack A. Goldstone ed., 2003).
33. A LexisNexis search found only four state statutes recognizing a multiracial category
and defining “multiracial” as biological parents of different races. See CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 8310.9(b)(1) (Deering 2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-135(a) (2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 515-5.1-6.5(b) (Lexis 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 18.1206a(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2018).
34. See, e.g., 14 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 103.2.10 (2018) (describing data for education
statistics); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.941(B) (LexisNexis 2017) (describing data for
school statistics); OR. ADMIN. R. 705-010-0040(4)(e) (2018) (describing data for student
groups); WASH REV. CODE ANN. §§ 28A.300.042, 28A.300.505 (2018) (describing data for
school statistics). According to one report, North Carolina had an “other” category, instead of
“multiracial,” on forms used to collect data for educational institutions. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 98-034, STATE SURVEY ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC
CLASSIFICATIONS 4 (1998), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs98/98034.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QSU2PNX].
35. Other states opt to follow the federal model permitting multiracial persons to check
more than one race box on state forms. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8310.9(b)(1); see also Racial
Identification of Individuals Under the Maryland Criminal Justice System, 85 Md. Op. Att’y
Gen. 38 (2000). With the exception of New Hampshire, there is virtually no reported
information explaining rejection of a multiracial category. The reasoning by the New
Hampshire state legislative committee provides some insights into why states may have
rejected a multiracial category: “While the committee was sympathetic to the intent of the
sponsor, it was discovered that most, if not all, forms used by the state requiring this
information are mandated by the federal government. Any change to these state form[s] could
result in the loss of federal funds.” H. Comm. on Exec. Dep’ts and Admin., H.R. 1997, Reg.
Sess. (N.H. 1997), http://gencourt.state.nh.us/SofS_Archives/1997/house/HB259H.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WLE3-NMTD] (committee report on H.R. 259). The Maryland State
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Further, discrimination claims by multiracial individuals tend to mirror
claims by monoracial plaintiffs. Even in cases where multiracial individuals
appear racially ambiguous, racial animus often arises after employers,
property owners, school officials, and other decision makers learn of a
person’s nonwhite ancestry.36 Thus, Tanya Hernández’s research of race
discrimination claims by multiracial plaintiffs concludes that existing
antidiscrimination jurisprudence is sufficient to address these claims.37
Advocates for a multiracial legal category argue that the discrimination
that multiracial individuals experience is grounded in their identification as a
separate and distinct racial group.38 While there is admittedly a biological
aspect to race, “biology is not fundamental. The origins of race are
sociocultural and political, and the main ways race is used are sociocultural
and political.”39 Thus there also is sociopolitical content attributed to race.40
Perhaps a more accurate characterization of efforts to obtain a multiracial
category on the census and other government forms is that advocates want
legal recognition of a sociopolitical racial category.41
Further, multiracial is both an ascribed and a personal identity usually
imposed on or adopted by children of interracial parentage. Given the
personal nature of racial identification for multiracials, “[t]here is no single
Thus, the larger question is whether
multiracial population.”42
multiracialism can be theorized as its own legal racial category. The next
Part more closely examines the claim for a multiracial legal racial category.
II. THEORIZING MULTIRACIALISM
Advocates who “cast[] ‘multiraciality’ as a new social phenomenon”
characterize the need for a multiracial category “as an issue of accuracy and
fairness.”43 Their concern was that multiracial individuals lacked an option
for accurately recognizing all of their heritage because “without proper racial
Attorney General offered a similar justification. See Racial Identification of Individuals Under
the Maryland Criminal Justice System, supra.
36. Hernández, supra note 29, at 3–5.
37. Id.
38. NOBLES, supra note 1, at 135.
39. Paul Spickard, Does Multiraciality Lighten?: Me-Too Ethnicity and the Whiteness
Trap, in NEW FACES IN A CHANGING AMERICA: MULTIRACIAL IDENTITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
290 (Loretta I. Winters & Herman L. DeBose eds., 2003) (citing The Illogic of American
Racial Categories, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 16 (Maria P.P. Root ed., 1992)).
40. Osagie Obasogie’s empirical research of blind people’s notion of race illustrates how
race is made visible by social practices. See generally OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, BLINDED BY
SIGHT: SEEING RACE THROUGH THE EYES OF THE BLIND (2014).
41. According to OMB, “The racial and ethnic categories set forth in the standards should
not be interpreted as being genetic, scientific, or anthropological in nature. For the purposes
of these standards, race is a socio-political construct.” FED. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. FOR
RESEARCH ON RACE & ETHNICITY, INTERIM REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET: REVIEW OF STANDARDS FOR MAINTAINING, COLLECTING, AND PRESENTING FEDERAL
DATA
ON
RACE
AND
ETHNICITY
6,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/whitehouse.gov/files/briefing-room/presidential-actions/related-omb-material/r_e_
iwg_interim_report_022417.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VAK-MTZU].
42. Gullickson & Morning, supra note 9, at 510.
43. NOBLES, supra note 1, at 135.

2018]

MULTIRACIAL MALAISE

2789

and ethnic classifications, multiracial people are ‘invisible’ in the health care
system.”44 The option of checking multiple boxes on the census addresses
the first part of this complaint, but the second concern mistakenly treats race
and ethnicity as necessary markers in biomedical research.45 It overlooks the
fact that racial identity for many post-Loving multiracial individuals is
personal and sometimes fluid—identity is not group based.
It is important to remember that “[t]hroughout history, [powers within the
United States used] racial designations . . . as tools of dominance, serving to
separate and penalize those not defined as white.”46 Since “race is not
grounded in genetics or nature, the project of defining races always involves
drawing and maintaining boundaries between those races.”47 One question
is what factors influence the drawing of boundaries.
More than two decades ago, Neil Gotanda theorized about the racialization
process in the United States.48 He continues to argue that the black-white
racial paradigm in America is the product of “the erasure of tribe, ethnicity,
and nationality” and the substitution of a largely two-race system: black and
white.49 Thus, discussions about the racialization of nonwhite groups, like
Asian Americans, Latinos, and more recently Middle Eastern-North Africans
(MENA), occur within the black-white paradigm.50 As such, the default
inquiry by these other outsider groups is how close they are to blackness or
whiteness.51 Given the strong preference for monoracial over multiracial

44. Id.
(citing
language
from
About
Us,
PROJECT
RACE,
http://www.projectrace.com/about_us/our_history/project-race/
[https://perma.cc/94A5RAFA] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018)).
45. For a criticism of the use of race or ethnicity in biomedical research, which argues that
race is a social, not so much a biological, phenomenon, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Legal
Constraints on the Use of Race in Biomedical Research: Toward a Social Justice Framework,
34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 526, 529 (2006); Taunya Lovell Banks, Funding Race as Biology: The
Relevance of ‘Race’ in Medical Research, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 571 (2011).
46. Kim M. Williams, Linking the Civil Rights and Multiracial Movements, in THE
POLITICS OF MULTIRACIALISM: CHALLENGING RACIAL THINKING 77, 78 (Heather M. Dalmage
ed., 2004).
47. Abby L. Ferber, Defending the Creation of Whiteness: White Supremacy and the
Threat of Interracial Sexuality, in THE POLITICS OF MULTIRACIALISM: CHALLENGING RACIAL
THINKING, supra note 46, at 43, 46.
48. See generally Gotanda, supra note 19.
49. Neil Gotanda, The Racialization of Islam in American Law, 637 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 184, 187 (2011).
50. See, e.g., Aihwa Ong, Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making: Immigrants Negotiate
Racial and Cultural Boundaries in the United States, 37 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 737, 739
(1996) (claiming that “discriminatory modes of perception, reception, and treatment order
Asian immigrants along a white-black continuum”); see also Caldwell, supra note 2, at 63–
67.
51. Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Race Inequity Fifty Years Later: Language Rights Under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 167, 209 (2014) (“Under the blackwhite paradigm, non-black minority groups can only seek legal redress to the extent to which
they can successfully analogize their experience to that of African Americans.”). For example,
in challenging a Mississippi state law mandating the separation of white and “colored” school
children, lawyers for the Chinese American child argued unsuccessfully that Chinese “stand
nearer to the white race than they do to the negro race.” Brief for Appellees at 774, Rice v.
Gong Lum, 104 So. 105 (1925) (No. 24-773), in 139 Miss. 760 (1925).
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categories, and the measuring of legal race against whiteness, a more
appropriate inquiry is whether the real racial binary is white versus nonwhite.
Some legal scholars criticize the black-white racial binary as
underinclusive.52 Early multiracial discourse reasserts a similar argument
that “[m]ultiracial identity is a discrete and integral racial identity that stands
alone; . . . not a subset of another racial identity.”53 The criticism mirrors
that of other nonwhite groups.54 Nevertheless, the real complaint of many
visible multiracial people is that they are racially categorized as nonwhite.
However, not all multiracial scholars support a multiracial category. Some
oppose government-identified racial categories and see racial identity as
personal and private.55 But, conventional racial categories are largely
ascribed—externally imposed—not internally driven.
In this regard, Gotanda identifies four ways that race appears in
constitutional law jurisprudence: status race—the inferior status of the racial
category; formal race—the completion of a recognized formal category;
historical race—a history of subordination by the superordinate group; and
culture race—the presence of a distinct culture from collective group
practice.56 Gotanda draws these categories directly from the black-white
experiences and racial practices in the United States. In that sense, they
exemplify the black-white racial paradigm. Assuming that these four usages
of race accurately delineate the black-white racial categories, the next step is
to apply them as criteria to test the proposed multiracial category.
Gotanda’s status-race model seems to most closely approximate the claims
of multiracial individuals, namely, that they are treated as a subordinated
racialized people because of their interracial parentage. But there is no
negative ascribed racial profile applied to multiracial individuals by the
dominant culture. Although there is literature about the “tragic mulatto,” a
stereotype grounded in the notion that the offspring of blacks and whites were
tainted by their black ancestry and thus inferior to whites,57 governments, and
the public, tend to treat racial categories as monoracial and mutually
exclusive.
Gotanda’s formal-race model also is inapplicable to multiracial
individuals. Until 1970, enumerators, in determining a person’s race for
census purposes, were instructed in the case of multiracial individuals to
select the nonwhite (or most subordinate group) when attaching a formal race
52. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The ‘Normal
Science’ of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213, 1220 (1997).
53. NOBLES, supra note 1, at 132.
54. Caldwell, supra note 2, at 65–75.
55. RALINA L. JOSEPH, TRANSCENDING BLACKNESS: FROM THE NEW MILLENNIUM
MULATTA TO THE EXCEPTIONAL MULTIRACIAL 25 (2013); SEXTON, supra note 21, at 57 (“We
reject the notion of white racial purity, and we affirm the right of otherwise self-determined
individuals to identify as they see fit—not as others would force them to identify.” (quoting
Charles Byrd, Founding Editor, Interracial Voice, Keynote Address at the First Annual
Multiracial Solidarity March (July 20, 1996)). Others assert that the existence and
acknowledgement of multiracial people tends to “undermine[] the very categories of racism.”
Spickard, supra note 39, at 291.
56. Gotanda, supra note 19, at 37–40, 56.
57. NOBLES, supra note 1, at 67.
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to that individual.58 The census consistently resisted efforts to formally
recognize a separate multiracial category. Granted, terms signaling racial
mixtures like “mulatto,” “quadroon,” and “octoroon” appeared in the census
during the late nineteenth century,59 but they referred to subcategories of the
racial category “black,” not separate racial categories.60 “Mixed-bloods,”
defined as white-Native American mixtures, is the only consistent multiracial
category recognized by the census.61
Some multiracial legal identity scholars might argue that the formal
erasure of multiracial individuals, subsuming them into existing monoracial
categories, formalizes their racial nonexistence. While this might be true, the
question remains: If racial identity is personal for most multiracial
individuals, what harm does legal nonrecognition cause if adequate legal
remedies exist when race-based discrimination occurs?
Today, some social science literature, like the Brookings Institution study
mentioned at the outset, offers a positive view of multiracial individuals, even
multiracial individuals with remote African ancestry. In the states that
recognize “multiracial” as a separate legal racial category, multiracial is not
maintained and reinforced by subordinating legal doctrine; rather, it serves
an affirming function—not a subordinating one.
Further, historic racial animus, reflected in antimiscegenation statutes, was
directed toward intermarriage between monoracial people. Granted,
antimiscegenation statutes might create the perception of animus directed at
multiracial children because intermarriage presented the possibility of
multiracial children.62 However, there is no history of discrimination based
on multiracial status because, until very recently, governments did not
recognize multiracial people as a separate and distinct group. Hernández
explains that the racial discrimination most frequently cited by multiracial

58. See id. at 72; PEW RESEARCH CTR., MULTIRACIAL IN AMERICA: PROUD, DIVERSE AND
GROWING
IN
NUMBERS
19–32
(2015),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/3/2015/06/2015-06-11_multiracial-in-america_final-updated.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BX5N-4AP2].
59. “Mulatto” appeared in the census from 1870 until the 1930 census when enumerators
were instructed to employ the “One-Drop” rule. NOBLES, supra note 1, at 52, 67–68. The
terms “quadroon” and “octoroon” appeared in the 1880 and 1890 censuses, but “the purpose
was to determine the extent of racial mixture among blacks and whether the race was becoming
more ‘purely Negro.’” Id. at 55.
60. Id. at 58. The term “mulatto” included “quadroons, octoroons, and all persons having
any perceptible trace of African blood.” Id.
61. Karl Eschbach et al., Changes in Racial Identification and the Educational Attainment
of American Indians, 1970–1990, 35 DEMOGRAPHY 35, 35–36 (1998); Ann Morning, New
Faces, Old Faces: Counting the Multiracial Population Past and Present, in NEW FACES IN
A CHANGING AMERICA: MULTIRACIAL IDENTITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 39, at 41,
43–44.
62. See, e.g., Louisiana Justice Who Refused Interracial Marriage Resigns, CNN (Nov.
3, 2009, 10:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/11/03/louisiana.interracial.marriage/
index.html [https://perma.cc/G7NB-QVF9] (describing the Louisiana Justice of the Peace who
refused to marry an interracial couple because of his belief that children might be born of the
union and interracial marriages do not last).
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people surveyed is being called a “mono-racial” nonwhite racial slur.63 Thus,
the claimed “racial” discrimination stems from multiracial individuals’
nonwhite ancestry.64
Finally, there is no culture of multiracialism—no collective group cultural
practices—because multiracialism is grounded in self-identity that varies
widely among multiracial people. Their situation is distinguishable from
newer racialized groups like Asian Americans and Latinos. Gotanda argues
that what distinguishes the racial experiences of Asian Americans and
Latinos from the black-white racial paradigm is culture.65 Each large group
is a collection of ethnicities—they are pan-ethnic groups,66 many with
different languages, histories, and cultural practices. These groups are
racially categorized based on their bodies—skin tone, phenotype, ancestral
home—and assigned legal racial categories.67 These nonwhite groups have
significant histories of subordination based on their assigned race or
ethnicity. In contrast, multiracial individuals see themselves as individuals,
not as a group with similar histories, experiences, and cultures.
As this suggests, it is unclear from the small number of discrimination
claims filed by multiracial individuals whether any ascribed subordination
occurs because of their multiracial bodies as opposed to the nonwhite aspect
of their raced body. Courts in racial discrimination cases involving
multiracial claimants understand this point and, when making legal
determinations, implicitly acknowledge the connection between ancestry,
skin tone, phenotype, and racial categorization.68
CONCLUSION
Melissa Nobles writes: “[c]ounting by race is justified precisely because
of the subjectivity of race and its political salience in American life, not
because of any objective reality.”69 The default racialization process is to
“add on” new formal-race categories. But these new categories—Asian
American, Latino, or MENA—also include distinct and additional
dimensions, which are consistent with Gotanda’s four usages of race and
explain why these groups are neither black nor white by law.
63. Hernández, supra note 29, at 3. Hernández writes that the type of racial discrimination
most frequently cited by multiracial people “includes pointed, derogatory comments about
non-whiteness and blackness in particular.” Id.
64. See Marc P. Johnston & Kevin L. Nadal, Multiracial Microagressions: Exposing
Monoracism in Everyday Life and Clinical Practice, in MICROAGGRESSIONS AND
MARGINALITY: MANIFESTATION, DYNAMICS AND IMPACT 123, 132–137 (Derald Wing Sue ed.,
2010).
65. Neil Gotanda, New Directions in Asian American Jurisprudence, 17 ASIAN AM. L.J.
5, 31–33 (2010).
66. For a discussion of pan-ethnicity, see Robert S. Chang & Neil Gotanda, The Race
Question in LatCrit Theory and Asian American Jurisprudence, 7 NEV. L.J. 1012, 1015, 1023–
24 (2007).
67. The label “Asian American” only dates back to the 1960s. Gotanda, supra note 49, at
188. Gotanda identifies three dominant Asian American tropes: foreignness, model-minority,
and terrorist. Gotanda, supra note 65, at 38–46.
68. Rives, supra note 13, at 1319–20.
69. NOBLES, supra note 1, at 77.
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But not all proposed add-on categories warrant legal recognition. As the
Supreme Court warned in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,70 simply
placing a racial category in a law is insufficient to withstand closer scrutiny
by courts faced with new categories.71 If accuracy in racial identification is
the real concern, the multiple-boxes option seems to address this issue.
Without more evidence, the claim that multiracial individuals constitute a
separate racial group for census (or antidiscrimination) purposes fails to
satisfy the criteria identified by Gotanda and used by the government.

70. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
71. See generally Neil Gotanda, Mapping the “Muslim” Category: An Examination of
Race, Identity, Religion, and the Black-White Racial Paradigm (May 15, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).

